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ABSTRACT
Recommendation systems for online dating have recently at-
tracted much attention from the research community. In this
paper we proposed a two-side matching framework for on-
line dating recommendations and design an LDA model to
learn the user preferences from the observed user messag-
ing behavior and user profile features. Experimental results
using data from a large online dating website shows that
two-sided matching improves significantly the rate of suc-
cessful matches by as much as 45%. Finally, using simulated
matchings we show that the the LDA model can correctly
capture user preferences.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recommending a partner in an online dating website is a
serious task. Dating recommendations are fundamentally
different from product recommendations. For instance, in
the extreme scenario where a TV celebrity decides to join a
dating website, thousands of (male or female) suitors1 would
be interested in dating the celebrity. But recommending the
celebrity to thousands of suitors would be a recipe for dis-
aster. On one hand, the celebrity would be inundated with
messages from suitors that he or she considers bad matches.
On the other hand, the rejected suitors would get frustrated
to see their messages go unreplied.
The above anecdotal example exposes a deeper general chal-
lenge: to jointly match the expectations of both sides of this
dating matching market2. Unfortunately, while the online
1We use suitor in a gender-neutral sense to define either
male or female suitors.
2A precise definition of a matching market is given in Sec-
tion 2.
dating literature has acknowledged the importance of re-
ceiver preferences (e.g., [2, 5, 8, 14, 17, 18]), little progress
has been made to learn these preferences from the data
rather than relying on self-declared preferences which can
be inaccurate [20].
In this work we put forth a probabilistic two-side dating
market framework that, through learned user preferences, is
able to increase the chances of making successful matches. In
our framework we introduce an LDA probabilistic model of
user preferences trained by the message exchanges between
users. This probabilistic model learns user preferences both
through the general user features and the observed user-
specific message exchanges. The main contribution of our
work is showing that (a) it is possible to learn receiver pref-
erences from their message exchanges and stated features;
and (b) applying the learned probabilistic model of user
preferences in our two-sided market formulation increases
the chances of successful matches.
To test our approach we use three months of recorded mes-
sages exchanges and user profiles of 2 million distinct male
and female pairs of users at Baihe, a large Chinese dating
website. Our results show that the two-side market formula-
tion together with the learning of user preferences increases
in up to 48% the rate of successful matches (as measured by
the rate of first contact replies) with respect to recommen-
dations based on the suitor’s preference alone. We also ar-
gue that graph-based recommendation systems are not ideal
for large sparse contact graphs such as the one observed at
Baihe.
The outline of this work is as follows. Section 2 presents the
modeling of the two-side matching market. Section 3 intro-
duces an LDA model to learn user preferences. Section 4
describes our experiments. Finally, sections 5 and 6 present
the related work and conclusions, respectively.
2. TWO-SIDED MATCHING MARKET
Balancing the expectations of the initiator and the receiver
is a challenging task. This balance is achieved when the
website operator cleverly enforces that a recommendation
occurs only if both the initiator and receiver would be in-
terested in the match. To provide a solid theoretic footing
to the above idea and, most importantly, to motivate the
importance of learning the receiver preference, we formulate
the matching problem as a two-sided matching market.
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The two sides of the market refer to the two types of agents
in the system (males and females) and a match is the rec-
ommendation of a male to a female or vice-versa. Note that
unlike the original formulation of matching markets (such as
Gale and Shapley’s formulation [10], see Roth and M. So-
tomayor [19] for a review of two-sided market problems), we
allow multiple “matches” by allowing multiple recommenda-
tions to the suitor and the same receiver be recommended to
multiple suitors. However, we enforce a cap in the average
number of (unread) messages a receiver gets per day, which
ultimately determines the number of times the receiver can
be recommended.
The website wants to provide recommendations that – un-
der the constraint that no receiver will be inundated with
messages (flow control) – either maximize the total num-
ber reciprocated messages (max utility), or any attempt to
make a recommendation that increases the reply rate of any
participant necessarily results in the decrease in the reply
rate of some other participant with an equal or smaller re-
ply rate (max-min fair). In what follows we present the max
utility optimization problem. Extending the optimization to
max-min fairness is trivial.
Formally, let V denote the set of website users. The indica-
tor function that tells if two users s, r ∈ V are on opposite
sides of the maker is
δsr =
{
1 if s and r are in opposite sides of the market,
0 otherwise.
Let xsr be the probability that user s is recommended to
user r. If s and r are on the same side of the market, i.e.,
δsr = 0, then xsr = 0, otherwise 0 ≤ xsr ≤ 1. The following
functions define the two-sided market optimization:
• f(s, r) is the probability that s initiates communica-
tion upon receiving a recommendation of user r.
• g(r, s) is the probability that r replies to s.
• CS(s) is the expected maximum number of messages
that user s can send during a day (suitor capacity),
r ∈ R
• CR(r) is the expected maximum number of messages
that user r should receive during a day (receiver ca-
pacity)
Most of the focus of this work is on learning f and g and
showing that there is much to gain when considering receiver
preferences. The values of CS and CR are determined by
the website operator. Using the above definitions the max
expected utility optimization is then
max
∑
s∈V
∑
r∈V
f(s, r)g(r, s)xsrδsr , (1)
subject to ∑
∀s 6=r
g(r, s)f(s, r)xsrδsr ≤ CR(r), ∀r,∑
∀r 6=s
g(r, s)f(s, r)xsrδsr ≤ CS(s), ∀s,
xsr ∈ (0, 1), ∀s, r.
The above optimization problem can be easily solved with
any off-the-shelf linear program package. An online fully
distributed solution, however, requires introducing the dual
and using shadow pricing to coordinate [12] the recommen-
dations across different servers, as task that is part of our
future work. In what follows we focus on our main goal, the
more challenging task of learning suitor and receiver dating
preferences from the data.
It is important to note that f and g are distinct functions;
that is, a suitor may avoid contacting users with a given
“undesirable” trait but, paradoxically, pay little heed to the
same trait when acting as a receiver (Slater [20] showcases
a variety of anecdotal examples of such behavior along with
the related social science literature that documents this dis-
crepancy). However, due to the limited amount data of our
dataset used to train our learning algorithm (more details
about our experiments in Section 4), we observe that treat-
ing f and g separately has an adverse effect in the number
of samples used to train our model and thus our ability to
correctly learn the true user preferences. Hence, in what fol-
lows we assume that f and g are equivalent (f ≡ g) in order
to use all message exchanges regardless to whether the user
acts as a suitor or as a receiver.
3. LEARNING DATING PREFERENCES
In this section, we first define user representation, user type
and user preference for the online dating network. We in-
troduce the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model and
modify it to learn user revealed preferences.
3.1 Dating Dataset
Our data consists of 200,000 uniformly sampled newly regis-
tered users in the month of November, 2011 from Baihe.com’s
Chinese dating website. It includes 139,482 males and 60,518
females, with each gender making up 69.7% and 30.3% of the
sampled users, respectively. Users come from all over China
and also abroad [21]. For each user we obtain all incoming
and outgoing messages from the date that the account was
created until January 31st, 2012. We also obtain profile in-
formation of all parties involved in these message exchanges,
totaling 2 million unique pairs of users exchanging messages
during our observation period. The content of each message
is removed for privacy concerns but other relevant informa-
tion remains, such as the message timestamp, the suitor’s
and receiver’s profiles, which consists of 21 features includ-
ing gender, age, registration timestamp, blood type, weight,
height, education, occupation, annual income level, housing
situation (renting, home owner), body type, Western zodiac
sign, Chinese zodiac sign, number of profile photos, whether
user owns a car, city of residence, and whether users has a
child and lives with the child, among other characteristics.
3.2 Selection of Relevant Features
In building a probabilistic model of user preferences, we first
significantly reduce the problem dimension by eliminating
features that have little predictive power on the likelihood
that a user will send or reply a message. Before we reduce
the number of features between pairs of users, we first ex-
pand the feature set to also include differences in age, height,
weight, education, and income, and whether or not the pair
has the same marriage and housing status.
To model user preference, we seek features that are strongly
correlated with the reply feature, as a reply indicates user
interest. We use two techniques to measure the corelation
between reply and other features: the score of information
gain ratio [9, 13] and “variable importance score” from ran-
dom forests [3]. We only keep variables with both scores
higher than average and removed the rest.
After that, there could be still variables containing the same
information to decide “reply” feature. For example, age and
Chinese zodiac sign, may be highly correlated and thus we
only need to include one of them, as the feature Chinese zo-
diac sign has 12 values representing the year when the user
is born. We measured the “information similarity” between
two variables with the conditional entropy and the mutual
information of each pair of features. Note that a small condi-
tional entropy means that the feature is largely determined
by the other. A large mutual information means two fea-
tures share information. A feature will be eliminated if there
exists another feature that contains most of its information
about the reply value. For instance, using the above age and
zodiac example we observe that the conditional entropy of
Chinese zodiac sign given age is H(Chinese zodiac|age) ≈ 0.
We identify as the five most relevant features: age, weight,
income difference, children information and height differ-
ence. Throughout the reminder of the paper we refer to
this five-feature tuple v =(age, weight, incomeDif, childInfo,
heightDif) as the feature vector of a user. The large num-
ber of unique values of age, weight, and height complicates
our information gain analysis. To ameliorate this problem
we apply the ChiMerge algorithm, a bottom-up Chi-square
quantization algorithm [16]. After discretization, feature age
has seven intervals, weight nine, height 11, making 21 inter-
vals in height difference. For each gender, we define the set
of all possible feature tuples V = {vd}Dd=1.
3.3 Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to
Uncover Latent User Preferences
Now that the set of relevant features is defined, we turn our
attention to grouping users into T (T is a constant) user
types according to their latent dating preferences. To sim-
plify our notation without loss of generality in what follows
we consider the suitors to be all on the same side of the
maker (say, females) and the receivers all to be on the other
side of the market (say, males). Latent Dirichlet Alloca-
tion (LDA) is a powerful statistical technique widely used
in Topic Modeling in Natural Language Processing [4]. LDA
defines a group of latent variables and, through Bayesian in-
ference, reveals the relations between latent topics and the
observed documents. These learned latent topics determine
the similarity between documents and can be used to classify
them.
Similarly, our model makes use of the observed message ex-
changes to learn user dating preferences. Figure 3.3 shows
our graphical model. Users have latent “types” that follow
distribution ~θ = (θ1, · · · , θT ). The value of ~θ is drawn from a
Dirichlet distributionDir(~θ;α~m) = Γ(α)∏T
t=1 Γ(αmt)
∏T
t=1 θ
αmt−1
t
with α > 0 and
∑
imi = 1. Let D denote the number of
users that send (initiate or reply) at least one message in the
training data and N the total number of such messages. Let
~z = (zd)
D
d=1 denote the user types drawn i.i.d. from the dis-
tribution ~θ. User d contacts (i.e., either initiates messages
or replies to received messages) kd > 0 users whose feature
sets are defined as ~wd = (w1,d, w2,d, · · · , wkd,d).
D 
α θ z 
β 
w 
N 
T 
Figure 1: LDA graphical model of user preference.
It is crucial to determine how user d chooses to engage in
message exchanges with other users on the other side of the
market. In our model the probability that user d contacts a
set of kd users with feature values ~wd is P (w1,d, w2,d, · · · , wkd,d|t) =
P (w1,d|t) · · ·P (wkd,d|t) =
∏kd
i=1 φwi,d|t, where φwi,d|t is a
parameter in categorical distribution ~φt = (φv|t)v∈V . LDA
model assumes the values of ~φt follows a Dirichlet distribu-
tion Dir( ~φt;β~n) =
Γ(β)∏
v∈V Γ(βnv)
∏
v∈V φ
βnv−1
v|t with hyper-
parameters β and
∑
i ni = 1.
Likelihood functions. The probability that the model gener-
ates the observed message exchanges in the data, observa-
tions formally defined as Data = (~w1, . . . , ~wD), is
P (Data|~z,Φ, ~θ) =
D∏
d=1
kd∏
i=1
P (wi,d|zd,Φ)
=
T∏
t=1
∏
v∈V
φ
Nv|t
v|t , (2)
where Φ = { ~φt}Tt=1. The posterior distribution is obtained
using Bayes rule
P (Φ|Data) = P (Data|Φ, θ, ~z)P (Φ)P (~z|θ)P (θ)
P (data, ~z)p(θ)
=
T∏
t=1
Dir
(
~φt;
(
βn1 +N1|t
β +Nt
, · · · , βn|V | +N|V ||t
β +Nt
))
. (3)
where Ni|t, (i = 1, · · · , |V |) is the number of messages from
type t suitor to receiver with feature tuple vi,
∑
iNi|t = Nt.
Similarly, the type of user d given evidence Data(−d), where
Data(−d) denotes Data without user d messages, is
P (zd = t|Data(−d)) =
∫
θ
P (zd = t|θ,Data(−d))P (θ|Data(−d))dθ
=
Dt + αmt
D + α
, (4)
where Dt is the number of users of type t and D =
∑T
t=1 Dt.
Learning user preferences through Gibbs sampling. Estimat-
ing Φ, ~θ, and ~z from the data through maximum likelihood
requires a combinatorial number of iterations. Hence, we
resort to Gibbs sampling to estimate the model parameters
from the data. Each user d with user type zd sends messages
to a set of receivers Wd = {wi,d}. Let subscript (−d) denote
a data structure without user’s d variable.
Using Gibbs sampling we sample the value of zd given ~z(−d)
and Data(−d) with probability
P (zd|Data, ~z(−d)) =
P (~wd, zd|Data(−d), ~z(−d))∑
zd
P (~wd, zd|Data(−d), ~z(−d))
∝ P (~wd, zd|Data(−d), ~z(−d)),
and substituting Eqs. (3) and (4) into the above expression
yields
P (~wd, zd = t|Data(−d), ~z(−d)) = P (Data, ~z)
P (Data(−d), ~z(−d))
∝ Γ(N
(−d)
t + β)∏
v Γ(N
(−d)
v|t + βnv)
∏
v Γ(Nv|t + βnv)
Γ(Nt + β)
D
(−d)
t + αmt
D − 1 + α ,
where N
(−d)
v|t is the number of receivers with the v-th fea-
ture tuple receiving from type t user in Data(−d), N
(−d)
t =∑
v N
(−d)
v|t , and Nt =
∑
v Nv|t.
3.4 Application to Two-sided Markets
In Section 2 we introduced the two-side matching market
with preference functions f(s, r) and g(r, s). We then made
the simplifying assumption that f ≡ g. In what follows we
obtain f (or g) from the data using our LDA results. Let
µ
(d)
t = P (zd = t|Data) and vd the relevant feature vector of
user d. Using the learned user mixture types and preferences
we can now define function f and g for the any user pair
(s, r):
f(s, r) = g(s, r) = δs,r
T∑
t=1
µ
(s)
t φvr|t , ∀s, r. (5)
3.5 Two-sided Markets & New Users
We use the above LDA model to estimate P [zd = t|~wd], the
probability that a user d’s user type zd = t given his mes-
sages. After that, ~φt, the preference of the user type t, is
assigned to him. However, we would like to say something
about users without observed message exchanges. A reason-
able way to solve this problem is to use the user profile to
predict the user type. We assume the relevant features in a
user’s profile have strong correlation with his user type, in
that case, we can use maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE)
to obtain the probability of the user type given his features
vd: q
(d)
t = P (zd = t|vd). For these users we can construct a
mixture of preferences from user s to a user r with feature
vector vr:
fˆ(s, r) = δs,r
T∑
t=1
q
(s)
t φvr|t, (6)
where fˆ(s, r) is the probability that user s initiates (or replies)
a message to user r that has feature vector vr. In what fol-
lows we use our data in combination with Eq. (6) and the
two-sided market formulation to significantly improve the
success rate of recommended matches.
4. RESULTS
In this section, we first measure how well the LDA model
can learn user preferences using synthetic data. We then
evaluate the gains obtained from recommending Baihe users
based on the learned preferences from the Baihe data (with
the techniques described in Section 3.3) and two-sided mar-
ket principles introduced in Section 2.
4.1 Results with Synthetic Data
To verify whether the LDA model can truly learn user prefer-
ences we simulate a dating market (since we cannot perform
live experiments at Baihe and there is no ground truth in
the Baihe dataset). We generated 20,000 male and female
users with profiles, respectively. Each simulated user has a
feature vector (age, has/lives with children, weight, income,
height). We calculated the marginal distribution of each
feature sample them from their empirical distribution in the
Baihe data.
Our simulator uses eight distinct user types, four types per
gender. For each gender, the user preference of type t is a
distribution over all feature vectors, denoted as pt = (pv1|t, . . . , pv|V ||t),
where v ∈ V is a feature vector and t = {(i, q) : i =
1, . . . 4, q ∈ {male, female}}. Each user type has, potentially,
a different set of favorite feature vectors such that users of
that type exchange messages differently than users of other
types. We then randomly select 5% of the feature vectors
in V that belong to the opposite gender as type t’s favorite
feature vectors, denoted as F . Then for each v ∈ F we set
pv|t with a value drawn uniformly from interval (300, 500).
For the remaining feature vectors, v ∈ V \F , pv|t is sampled
uniformly from the interval (1, 2). Finally, we normalize pt
such that
∑
v∈V pv|t = 1.
To simulate the dating dynamics we randomly recommend
100 users of the opposite gender to each user, henceforth
denoting the set of recommended users L. Each user then
chooses kd receivers among the 100 recommendations, where
kd is a value uniformly sampled from {0, . . . , 10}. The kd
lucky receivers are chosen from user set L through a multi-
nomial distribution with parameters 100, kd, and (pv|t)v∈L.
For the LDA estimation we set the maximum number of user
types T = 10 for each gender in order to test the impact of
having more user types in the model than the data allows.
The goal of this experiment is to test if the LDA model can
correctly learn the four preferences for each of the genders.
Table 1: Matching Male User Type
Type Precision Recall K-L divergence
type 1 98.8% 99.8% 8.578e-05
type 2 98.2% 99.9% -9.013e-05
type 3 99.3% 98.6% 7.401e-05
type 4 100% 100% 6.515e-05
Table 2: Matching Female User Type
Type Precision Recall K-L divergence
type 1 96.8% 99.4% -1.463e-04
type 2 99.7% 99.8% 9.117e-05
type 3 98/3% 98.4% 1.863e-04
type 4 98.5% 96.8% -1.421e-04
Our results show that our model classifies most males (99.5%)
and females (99.6%) into one of four large user type groups,
showing that despite the maximum number of user types
of each gender being large, T = 10, the model is able to
learn the correct number of distinct user types (four) for
both genders. Focusing only on these four largest estimated
groups (of user types) of each gender we now compare the
true preferences, pt = (pv1|t, . . . , pv|V ||t), against the learned
preference from our model, φt. For this comparison we use
the K-L divergence between pt and φt:
3
DKL(pt||φt) =
V∑
v=1
log
(
pv|t
φv|t
)
pv|t.
Tables 1 and 2 show the precision and recall of each es-
timated user type for males and females, respectively. The
precision and recall are close to 100%, showing that the LDA
estimation indeed was able to accurately recover the user
type with just a few observed messages (in average 4.5 per
user) . Also note that the K-L divergences are low, suggest-
ing that the estimated and true preferences are remarkably
similar.
4.2 Baihe Results
In this section we focus on testing whether the two-sided
matching recommendations can improve the number of suc-
cessful matches in the Baihe dataset. Henceforth we denote
“probability that a suitor message is replied” as the success
rate. Recall that the success rate is the utility function in
that we seek to maximize in Eq. (1). Our experiment obeys
the following principle: we eliminate half of the messages
sent from suitors to receivers. For each suitor in the dataset
that has messages sent to two or more distinct receivers,
we use the distinct recommendation algorithms to choose
which message stay in the dataset and which message are
discarded. We then compare the performance of the rec-
ommendation algorithms by contrasting the average success
rate of the messages that stayed in the dataset.
In the above experiment we compare three recommendation
algorithms: (a) random, (b) suitor preference (f(s, r)), and
(c) two-sided (suitor and receiver) preference (f(s, r)g(r, s)).
We first use LDA model to learn the user preferences in the
training set. We then assign those preferences to the users in
the testing set with the mixture model. First we partition
the suitors into ten equal size datasets {Ui}10i=1 such that
there are no messages between the users in distinct parti-
tions. We use nine randomly selected dataset partitions to
train the LDA model and the one partition not used for
training is used to test our algorithm; without loss of gen-
erality we denote the test partition U10. This training-test
procedure is known as ten-fold cross validation.
We rank the messages sent by each suitor s ∈ U10 to its
receivers {ri}ksi=1 according to either fˆ(s, ri) if the recom-
mendation just uses the suitor preference or fˆ(s, ri)fˆ(ri, s)
if it is a two-sided recommendation, where fˆ(s, r) is as de-
scribed in Eq. (6). We must use fˆ of Eq. (6) instead of f
of Eq. (5) as s and ri are in the test set, i.e., our learning
algorithm was not trained with the message exchanges of
s. We then keep the top half of the ranked messages and
discard the rest of the messages. Our measure of goodness
is the success rate of the top half ranked messages.
Figure 2 shows average success rate experienced by male
3
To solve the problem of matching the correct learned user type label
t with the true user type label we consider a bipartite graph G(Eg, Vg)
with nodes of true preferences pi ∈ Vg on one side and nodes of the
revealed preferences φj ∈ Vg on the other, the weight of the edge
ei,j = e(pi, φj) ∈ Eg is the K-L divergence DKL(pi||φj). We can
match the defined preferences to the revealed preferences by solving
the minimum weight matching in polynomial time.
and female suitors based on the suitor preference. Interest-
ingly, these success rates are the same as in random selection.
Male suitors have a much lower success rate, with an average
12.2% chance of having their messages replied, while females
are significantly more successful, with an average of 21.7%
success rate. The black bars in Figure 2 shows the standard
deviation of our experiments. We now contrast the above
results with the success rate of messages selected based on
two-sided preferences. Figure 3 shows a box plot of the rela-
tive percentage gain of success rate of two-sided preferences
over the success rate using suitor preferences alone. Male
suitors have a significant improvement in their success rate
showing an median of 46.84% higher success rates. Female
suitors also show a median improvement of 16.5% higher
success rates. These experiments indicate that two-sided
framework can achieve more successful matchings than tra-
ditional suitor-only recommendations.
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Figure 2: Success rate of one-sided suitor-based rec-
ommendations.
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Figure 3: Relative gain in success rate of two-sided
over one-sided suitor-based recommendations.
LDA preferences v.s. stated preferences. In Baihe users can
state features of their preferred mates. To test whether LDA
preferences are more predictive of the true preference than
the user’s stated preference we test the predictive power of
LDA learned preferences against the user stated preferences.
Figure 4 shows the probability of a receiver reply given his
or her LDA and stated preferences. The LDA learned pref-
erences of the receivers clearly outperform their stated pref-
erences.
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Figure 4: LDA learned preferences are better pre-
dictors of user reply than their stated preferences.
5. RELATEDWORK
Online match-making “user-to-user” recommendation sys-
tems differ from ordinary “user-to-item” in that a match
is only successful if both sides (suitor and receiver) agree
that the match is good [5, 15, 22]. Recently there has been
much effort in building recommendation systems based on
the “user-to-user” matching concept [1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14,
17, 18].
The majority of the “user-to-user” online dating recommen-
dation systems are graph-based collaborative filtering algo-
rithms [5, 6, 7, 15]. For instance, Kutty et al. [15] proposed a
graph mining technique that calculates the similarity of the
users’ preferences and the similarity of user profiles accord-
ing to both the users’ stated preferences and the structure
of “user-attribute bipartite network”. Unlike online social
networks (OSNs), where collaborative graph-based filtering
makes sense due to the highly clustered nature of OSNs,
the bipartite matching graph tends to be highly sparse. For
a graph-based collaborative filter to work as a recommen-
dation system, the recommended matchings must be artifi-
cially clustered by recommending the same set of “receivers”
to suitors that are deemed similar. This approach, however,
creates the odd situation where similar suitors are artificially
forced to compete for the same set of possible dates.
A more theoretically sound approach to two-sided match-
ing markets is found in the work of Adachi [1]. Adachi
introduces a search cost penalty to the Gale-Shapley two-
sided matching formulation [10]. Hitsch et al. [11] uses
Adachi’s formulation, together with an interesting psycho-
logical study of the matching market and user preferences,
to argue that Adachi’s algorithm can be combined with a
feature-based logistic regression as a recommendation sys-
tem for online dating. Our framework has significant of ad-
vantages over that of Adachi [1] and Hitsch et al. [11]. First,
our probabilistic framework (Eq. (1)) avoids the unnecessary
computational hardness and sub-optimality of binary opti-
mization problems. Second, in our framework preferences
are seen as probabilities, making it easier to map the output
of probabilistic models (e.g., LDA) to the implementation
of the algorithm. Third, unlike Adachi’s framework, there
is no abstract “search cost penalty”. Rather, our framework
constraints are intuitive to website operators: the average
number of recommendations to a single user and the average
number messages a user should receive. Finally, unlike the
feature-based logistic regression used in Hitsch et al. [11], we
propose a model that is also able to tailor the recommenda-
tions to the observed user behavior rather than being solely
restricted to user features.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we propose a probabilistic two-side matching
market framework for online dating recommendations. We
show that considering preferences of both sides of the market
can dramatically improve the number of successful matches.
We also show how an LDA-based algorithm that learns user
preferences can be incorporated into our framework. In a
synthetic dating market we show that our LDA model can
successfully classify similar users and learn their preferences.
Interestingly, by using LDA we gain the ability of using un-
structured text (such as user self-descriptions) as features
for free. Our principled probabilistic two-sided matching
framework sheds light into key fundamental principles of
online dating matchings.
Our recommendation system is, however, incomplete. While
we believe our framework is both practical and scalable, it
has not been implemented in a large live system. Moreover,
a principled approach to incorporate user queries [8] into
our framework remains an open problem. Replacing LDA
with psychological principled models of user preference and
behavior may also prove advantageous in our framework, but
whether or not other models of user preference can improve
upon our simple LDA model remains to be seen.
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